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Abstract
Increasingly encompassing models have been suggested for our world. The-
ories range from generally accepted to increasingly speculative to apparently
bogus. The progression of theories from ego- to geo- to helio-centric models to
universe and multiverse theories and beyond was accompanied by a dramatic
increase in the sizes of the postulated worlds, with humans being expelled from
their center to ever more remote and random locations. Rather than leading
to a true theory of everything, this trend faces a turning point after which the
predictive power of such theories decreases (actually to zero). Incorporating
the location and other capacities of the observer into such theories avoids this
problem and allows to distinguish meaningful from predictively meaningless
theories. This also leads to a truly complete theory of everything consisting of
a (conventional objective) theory of everything plus a (novel subjective) ob-
server process. The observer localization is neither based on the controversial
anthropic principle, nor has it anything to do with the quantum-mechanical
observation process. The suggested principle is extended to more practical
(partial, approximate, probabilistic, parametric) world models (rather than
theories of everything). Finally, I provide a justification of Ockham’s razor,
and criticize the anthropic principle, the doomsday argument, the no free
lunch theorem, and the falsifiability dogma.
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“... in spite of it’s incomputability, Algorithmic Probability can serve as
a kind of ‘Gold Standard’ for induction systems”
— Ray Solomonoff (1997)
“There is a theory which states that if ever anyone discovers exactly
what the Universe is for and why it is here, it will instantly disappear
and be replaced by something even more bizarre and inexplicable. There
is another theory which states that this has already happened.”
— Douglas Adams, Hitchhikers guide to the Galaxy (1979)
1 Introduction
This paper uses an information-theoretic and computational approach for addressing
the philosophical problem of judging theories (of everything) in physics. In order to
keep the paper generally accessible, I’ve tried to minimize field-specific jargon and
mathematics, and focus on the core problem and its solution.
By theory I mean any model which can explain≈describe≈predict≈compress
[Hut06a] our observations, whatever the form of the model. Scientists often say
that their model explains some phenomenon. What is usually meant is that the
model describes (the relevant aspects of) the observations more compactly than the
raw data. The model is then regarded as capturing a law (of nature), which is
believed to hold true also for unseen/future data.
This process of inferring general conclusions from example instances is call induc-
tive reasoning. For instance, observing 1000 black ravens but no white one supports
but cannot prove the hypothesis that all ravens are black. In general, induction is
used to find properties or rules or models of past observations. The ultimate pur-
pose of the induced models is to use them for making predictions, e.g. that the next
observed raven will also be black. Arguably inductive reasoning is even more impor-
tant than deductive reasoning in science and everyday life: for scientific discovery,
in machine learning, for forecasting in economics, as a philosophical discipline, in
common-sense decision making, and last but not least to find theories of everything.
Historically, some famous, but apparently misguided philosophers [Sto82, Gar01],
including Popper and Miller, even disputed the existence, necessity or validity of
inductive reasoning. Meanwhile it is well-known how minimum encoding length
principles [Wal05, Gru¨07], rooted in (algorithmic) information theory [LV08], quan-
tify Ockham’s razor principle, and lead to a solid pragmatic foundation of inductive
reasoning [Hut07]. Essentially, one can show that the more one can compress, the
better one can predict, and vice versa.
A deterministic theory/model allows from initial conditions to determine an ob-
servation sequence, which could be coded as a bit string. For instance, Newton
mechanics maps initial planet positions+velocities into a time-series of planet posi-
tions. So a deterministic model with initial conditions is “just” a compact represen-
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tation of an infinite observation string. A stochastic model is “just” a probability
distribution over observation strings.
Classical models in physics are essentially differential equations describing the
time-evolution of some aspects of the world. A Theory of Everything (ToE) models
the whole universe or multiverse, which should include initial conditions. As I
will argue, it can be crucial to also localize the observer, i.e. to augment the ToE
with a model of the properties of the observer, even for non-quantum-mechanical
phenomena. I call a ToE with observer localization, a Complete ToE (CToE).
That the observer itself is important in describing our world is well-known. Most
prominently in quantum mechanics, the observer plays an active role in ‘collapsing
the wave function’. This is a specific and relatively well-defined role of the observer
for a particular theory, which is not my concern. I will show that (even the local-
ization of) the observer is indispensable for finding or developing any (useful) ToE.
Often, the anthropic principle is invoked for this purpose (our universe is as it is
because otherwise we would not exist). Unfortunately its current use is rather vague
and limited, if not outright unscientific [Smo04]. In Section 6 I extend Schmidhuber’s
formal work [Sch00] on computable ToEs to formally include observers. Schmidhu-
ber [Sch00] already discusses observers and mentions sampling universes consistent
with our own existence, but this part stays informal. I give a precise and formal ac-
count of observers by explicitly separating the observer’s subjective experience from
the objectively existing universe or multiverse, which besides other things shows that
we also need to localize the observer within our universe (not only which universe
the observer is in).
In order to make the main point of this paper clear, Section 2 first traverses a
number of models that have been suggested for our world, from generally accepted
to increasingly speculative and questionable theories. Section 3 discusses the relative
merits of the models, in particular their predictive power (precision and coverage).
We will see that localizing the observer, which is usually not regarded as an issue,
can be very important. Section 4 gives an informal introduction to the necessary
ingredients for CToEs, and how to evaluate and compare them using a quantified
instantiation of Ockham’s razor. Section 5 gives a formal definition of what accounts
for a CToE, introduces more realistic observers with limited perception ability, and
formalizes the CToE selection principle. The Universal ToE is a sanity critical
point in the development of ToEs, and will be investigated in more detail in Section
6. Extensions to more practical (partial, approximate, probabilistic, parametric)
theories (rather than ToEs) are briefly discussed in Section 7. In Section 8 I show
that Ockham’s razor is well-suited for finding ToEs and briefly criticize the anthropic
principle, the doomsday argument, the no free lunch theorem, and the falsifiability
dogma. Section 9 concludes.
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2 Theories of Something, Everything & Nothing
A number of models have been suggested for our world. They range from generally
accepted to increasingly speculative to outright unacceptable. For the purpose of
this work it doesn’t matter where you personally draw the line. Many now generally
accepted theories have once been regarded as insane, so using the scientific commu-
nity or general public as a judge is problematic and can lead to endless discussions:
for instance, the historic geo↔heliocentric battle; and the ongoing discussion of
whether string theory is a theory of everything or more a theory of nothing. In a
sense this paper is about a formal rational criterion to determine whether a model
makes sense or not. In order to make the main point of this paper clear, below I
will briefly traverse a number of models. Space constraints prevent to explain these
models properly, but most of them are commonly known; see e.g. [Har00, BDH04]
for surveys. The presented bogus models help to make clear the necessity of observer
localization and hence the importance of this work.
(G) Geocentric model. In the well-known geocentric model, the Earth is at the
center of the universe and the Sun, the Moon, and all planets and stars move around
Earth. The ancient model assumed concentric spheres, but increasing precision in
observations and measurements revealed a quite complex geocentric picture with
planets moving with variable speed on epicycles. This Ptolemaic system predicted
the celestial motions quite well for its time, but was relatively complex in the com-
mon sense and in the sense of involving many parameters that had to be fitted
experimentally.
(H) Heliocentric model. In the modern (later) heliocentric model, the Sun is
at the center of the solar system (or universe), with all planets (and stars) moving
in ellipses around the Sun. Copernicus developed a complete model, much simpler
than the Ptolemaic system, which interestingly did not offer better predictions ini-
tially, but Kepler’s refinements ultimately outperformed all geocentric models. The
price for this improvement was to expel the observers (humans) from the center of
the universe to one out of 8 moving planets. While today this price seems small,
historically it was quite high. Indeed we will compute the exact price later.
(E) Effective theories. After the celestial mechanics of planets have been under-
stood, ever more complex phenomena could be captured with increasing coverage.
Newton’s mechanics unifies celestial and terrestrial gravitational phenomena. When
unified with special relativity theory one arrives at Einstein’s general relativity, pre-
dicting large scale phenomena like black holes and the big bang. On the small scale,
electrical and magnetic phenomena are unified by Maxwell’s equations for electro-
magnetism. Quantum mechanics and electromagnetism have further been unified to
quantum electrodynamics (QED). QED is the most powerful theory ever invented,
in terms of precision and coverage of phenomena. It is a theory of all physical and
chemical processes, except for radio-activity and gravity.
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(P) Standard model of particle physics. Salam, Glashow and Weinberg ex-
tended QED to include weak interactions, responsible for radioactive decay. To-
gether with quantum chromo dynamic [Hut96], which describes the nucleus, this
constitutes the current standard model (SM) of particle physics. It describes all
known non-gravitational phenomena in our universe. There is no experiment indi-
cating any limitation (precision, coverage). It has about 20 unexplained parameters
(mostly masses and coupling constants) that have to be (and are) experimentally
determined (although some regularities can be explained [BH97]). The effective
theories of the previous paragraph can be regarded as approximations of SM, hence
SM, although founded on a subatomic level, also predicts medium scale phenomena.
(S) String theory. Pure gravitational and pure quantum phenomena are perfectly
predictable by general relativity and the standard model, respectively. Phenomena
involving both, like the big bang, require a proper final unification. String theory
is the candidate for a final unification of the standard model with the gravitational
force. As such it describes the universe at its largest and smallest scale, and all scales
in-between. String theory is essentially parameter-free, but is immensely difficult to
evaluate and it seems to allow for many solutions (spatial compactifications). For
these and other reasons, there is currently no uniquely accepted cosmological model.
(C) Cosmological models. Our concept of what the universe is, seems to ever
expand. In ancient times there was Earth, Sun, Moon, and a few planets, surrounded
by a sphere of shiny points (fixed stars). The current textbook universe started in
a big bang and consists of billions of galaxy clusters each containing billions of
stars, probably many with a planetary system. But this is just the visible universe.
According to inflation models, which are needed to explain the homogeneity of our
universe, the “total” universe is vastly larger than the visible part.
(M) Multiverse theories. Many theories (can be argued to) imply a multitude of
essentially disconnected universes (in the conventional sense), often each with their
own (quite different) characteristics [Teg04]. In Wheeler’s oscillating universe a new
big bang follows the assumed big crunch, and this repeats indefinitely. Lee Smolin
proposed that every black hole recursively produces new universes on the “other
side” with quite different properties. Everett’s many-worlds interpretation of quan-
tum mechanics postulates that the wave function doesn’t collapse but the universe
splits (decoheres) into different branches, one for each possible outcome of a mea-
surement. Some string theorists have suggested that possibly all compactifications
in their theory are realized, each resulting in a different universe.
(U) Universal ToE. The last two multiverse suggestions contain the seed of a gen-
eral idea. If theory X contains some unexplained elements Y (quantum or compact-
ification or other indeterminism), one postulates that every realization of Y results
in its own universe, and we just happen to live in one of them. Often the anthropic
principle is used in some hand-waving way to argue why we are in this and not that
universe [Smo04]. Taking this to the extreme, Schmidhuber [Sch97, Sch00] postu-
lates a multiverse (which I call universal universe) that consists of every computable
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universe (note there are “just” countably many computer programs). Clearly, if our
universe is computable, then it is contained in the universal universe, so we have a
ToE already in our hands. Similar in spirit but neither constructive nor formally
well-defined is Tegmark’s mathematical multiverse [Teg08].
(R) Random universe. Actually there is a much simpler way of obtaining a ToE.
Consider an infinite sequence of random bits (fair coin tosses). It is easy to see
that any finite pattern, i.e. any finite binary sequence, occurs (actually infinitely
often) in this string. Now consider our observable universe quantized at e.g. Planck
level, and code the whole space-time universe into a huge bit string. If the universe
ends in a big crunch, this string is finite. (Think of a digital high resolution 3D
movie of the universe from the big bang to the big crunch). This big string also
appears somewhere in our random string, hence our random string is a perfect ToE.
This is reminiscent of the Boltzmann brain idea that in a sufficiently large random
universe, there exist low entropy regions that resemble our own universe and/or
brain (observer) [BT86, Sec.3.8].
(A) All-a-Carte models. The existence of true randomness is controversial and
complicates many considerations. So ToE (R) may be rejected on this ground,
but there is a simple deterministic computable variant. Glue the natural numbers
written in binary format, 1,10,11,100,101,110,111,1000,1001,... to one long string.
1101110010111011110001001...
The decimal version is known as Champernowne’s number. Obviously it contains
every finite substring by construction. Indeed, it is a Normal Number in the sense
that it contains every substring of length n with the same relative frequency (2−n).
Many irrational numbers like
√
2, π, and e are conjectured to be normal. So Cham-
pernowne’s number and probably even
√
2 are perfect ToEs.
Remarks. I presume that every reader of this section at some point regarded the
remainder as bogus. In a sense this paper is about a rational criterion to decide
whether a model is sane or insane. The problem is that the line of sanity differs for
different people and different historical times.
Moving the earth out of the center of the universe was (and for some even still
is) insane. The standard model is accepted by nearly all physicists as the closest
approximation to a ToE so far. Only outside physics, often by opponents of reduc-
tionism, this view has been criticized. Some respectable researchers including Nobel
Laureates go further and take string theory and even some Multiverse theories seri-
ous. Universal ToE also has a few serious proponents. Whether Boltzmann’s random
noise or my All-a-Carte ToE find adherers needs to be seen. For me, Universal ToE
(U) is the sanity critical point. Indeed UToE will be investigated in greater detail
in later sections.
References to the dogmatic Bible, Popper’s misguided falsifiability principle
[Sto82, Gar01], and wrong applications of Ockham’s razor are the most popular
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pseudo justifications of what theories are (in)sane. More serious arguments involv-
ing the usefulness of a theory will be discussed in the next section.
3 Predictive Power & Observer Localization
In the last section I have enumerated some models of (parts or including) the uni-
verse, roughly sorted in increasing size of the universe. Here I discuss their relative
merits, in particular their predictive power (precision and coverage). Analytical or
computational tractability also influences the usefulness of a theory, but can be ig-
nored when evaluating its status as a ToE. For example, QED is computationally
a nightmare, but this does not at all affect its status as the theory of all electrical,
magnetic, and chemical processes. On the other hand, we will see that localizing
the observer, which is usually not regarded as an issue, can be very important. The
latter has nothing to do with the quantum-mechanical measuring process, although
there may be some deeper yet to be explored connection.
Particle physics. The standard model has more power and hence is closer to a
ToE than all effective theories (E) together. String theory plus the right choice of
compactification reduces to the standard model, so has the same or superior power.
The key point here is the inclusion of the “right choice of compactification”. Without
it, string theory is in some respect less powerful than SM.
Baby universes. Let us now turn to the cosmological models, in particular Smolin’s
baby universe theory, in which infinitely many universes with different properties
exist. The theory “explains” why a universe with our properties exist (since it
includes universes with all kinds of properties), but it has little predictive power.
The baby universe theory plus a specification in which universe we happen to live
would determine the value of the inter-universe variables for our universe, and hence
have much more predictive power. So localizing ourselves increases the predictive
power of the theory.
Universal ToE. Let us consider the even larger universal multiverse. Assuming
our universe is computable, the multiverse generated by UToE contains and hence
perfectly describes our universe. But this is of little use, since we can’t use UToE for
prediction. If we knew our “position” in this multiverse, we would know in which
(sub)universe we are. This is equivalent to knowing the program that generates
our universe. This program may be close to any of the conventional cosmological
models, which indeed have a lot of predictive power. Since locating ourselves in
UToE is equivalent and hence as hard as finding a conventional ToE of our universe,
we have not gained much.
All-a-Carte models also contain and hence perfectly describe our universe. If and
only if we can localize ourselves, we can actually use it for predictions. (For instance,
if we knew we were in the center of universe 001011011 we could predict that we will
‘see’ 0010 when ‘looking’ to the left and 1011 when looking to the right.) Let u be a
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snapshot of our space-time universe; a truly gargantuan string. Locating ourselves
means to (at least) locate u in the multiverse. We know that u is the u’s number
in Champernowne’s sequence (interpreting u as a binary number), hence locating
u is equivalent to specifying u. So a ToE based on normal numbers is only useful
if accompanied by the gargantuan snapshot u of our universe. In light of this, an
“All-a-Carte” ToE (without knowing u) is rather a theory of nothing than a theory
of everything.
Localization within our universe. The loss of predictive power when enlarging
a universe to a multiverse model has nothing to do with multiverses per se. Indeed,
the distinction between a universe and a multiverse is not absolute. For instance,
Champernowne’s number could also be interpreted as a single universe, rather than a
multiverse. It could be regarded as an extreme form of the infinite fantasia land from
the NeverEnding Story, where everything happens somewhere. Champernowne’s
number constitutes a perfect map of the All-a-Carte universe, but the map is useless
unless you know where you are. Similarly but less extreme, the inflation model
produces a universe that is vastly larger than its visible part, and different regions
may have different properties.
Egocentric to Geocentric model. Consider now the “small” scale of our daily
life. A young child believes it is the center of the world. Localization is trivial. It is
always at “coordinate” (0,0,0). Later it learns that it is just one among a few billion
other people and as little or much special as any other person thinks of themself.
In a sense we replace our egocentric coordinate system by one with origin (0,0,0) in
the center of Earth. The move away from an egocentric world view has many social
advantages, but dis-answers one question: Why am I this particular person and not
any other? (It also comes at the cost of constantly having to balance egoistic with
altruistic behavior.)
Geocentric to Heliocentric model. While being expelled from the center of
the world as an individual, in the geocentric model, at least the human race as
a whole remains in the center of the world, with the remaining (dead?) universe
revolving around us. The heliocentric model puts Sun at (0,0,0) and degrades Earth
to planet number 3 out of 8. The astronomic advantages are clear, but dis-answers
one question: Why this planet and not one of the others? Typically we are muzzled
by questionable anthropic arguments [Bos02, Smo04]. (Another scientific cost is the
necessity now to switch between coordinate systems, since the ego- and geocentric
views are still useful.)
Heliocentric to modern cosmological model. The next coup of astronomers
was to degrade our Sun to one star among billions of stars in our milky way, and
our milky way to one galaxy out of billions of others. It is generally accepted that
the question why we are in this particular galaxy in this particular solar system is
essentially unanswerable.
Summary. The exemplary discussion above has hopefully convinced the reader
that we indeed lose something (some predictive power) when progressing to too
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large universe and multiverse models. Historically, the higher predictive power of the
large-universe models (in which we are seemingly randomly placed) overshadowed
the few extra questions they raised compared to the smaller ego/geo/helio-centric
models. (we’re not concerned here with the psychological disadvantages/damage,
which may be large). But the discussion of the (physical, universal, random, and
all-a-carte) multiverse theories has shown that pushing this progression too far will
at some point harm predictive power. We saw that this has to do with the increasing
difficulty to localize the observer.
4 Complete ToEs (CToEs)
A ToE by definition is a perfect model of the universe. It should allow to predict all
phenomena. Most ToEs require a specification of some initial conditions, e.g. the
state at the big bang, and how the state evolves in time (the equations of motion).
In general, a ToE is a program that in principle can “simulate” the whole universe.
An All-a-Carte universe perfectly satisfies this condition but apparently is rather a
theory of nothing than a theory of everything. So meeting the simulation condition is
not sufficient for qualifying as a Complete ToE. We have seen that (objective) ToEs
can be completed by specifying the location of the observer. This allows us to make
useful predictions from our (subjective) viewpoint. We call a ToE plus observer
localization a subjective or complete ToE. If we allow for stochastic (quantum)
universes we also need to include the noise. If we consider (human) observers with
limited perception ability we need to take that into account too. So
A complete ToE needs specification of
(i) initial conditions
(e) state evolution
(l) localization of observer
(n) random noise
(o) perception ability of observer
We will ignore noise and perception ability in the following and resume to these
issues in Sections 7 and 5, respectively. Next we need a way to compare ToEs.
Epistemology. I assume that the observers’ experience of the world consists of a
single temporal binary sequence which gets longer with time. This is definitely true
if the observer is a robot equipped with sensors like a video camera whose signal
is converted to a digital data stream, fed into a digital computer and stored in a
binary file of increasing length. In humans, the signal transmitted by the optic
and other sensory nerves could play the role of the digital data stream. Of course
(most) human observers do not possess photographic memory. We can deal with
this limitation in various ways: digitally record and make accessible upon request
the nerve signals from birth till now, or allow for uncertain or partially remembered
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observations. Classical philosophical theories of knowledge [Alc06] (e.g. as justified
true belief) operate on a much higher conceptual level and therefore require stronger
(and hence more disputable) philosophical presuppositions. In my minimalist “spar-
tan” information-theoretic epistemology, a bit-string is the only observation, and all
higher ontologies are constructed from it and are pure “imagination”.
Predictive power and elegance. Whatever the intermediary guiding principles
for designing theories/models (elegance, symmetries, tractability, consistency), the
ultimate judge is predictive success. Unfortunately we can never be sure whether a
given ToE makes correct predictions in the future. After all we cannot rule out that
the world suddenly changes tomorrow in a totally unexpected way (cf. the quote at
beginning of this article). We have to compare theories based on their predictive
success in the past. It is also clear that the latter is not enough: For every model we
can construct an alternative model that behaves identically in the past but makes
different predictions from, say, year 2020 on. Popper’s falsifiability dogma is little
helpful. Beyond postdictive success, the guiding principle in designing and selecting
theories, especially in physics, is elegance and mathematical consistency. The pre-
dictive power of the first heliocentric model was not superior to the geocentric one,
but it was much simpler. In more profane terms, it has significantly less parameters
that need to be specified.
Ockham’s razor suitably interpreted tells us to choose the simpler among two
or more otherwise equally good theories. For justifications of Ockham’s razor, see
[LV08] and Section 8. Some even argue that by definition, science is about applying
Ockham’s razor, see [Hut05]. For a discussion in the context of theories in physics,
see [GM94]. It is beyond the scope of this paper to repeat these considerations.
In Sections 4 and 8 I will show that simpler theories more likely lead to correct
predictions, and therefore Ockham’s razor is suitable for finding ToEs.
Complexity of a ToE. In order to apply Ockham’s razor in a non-heuristic way,
we need to quantify simplicity or complexity. Roughly, the complexity of a theory
can be defined as the number of symbols one needs to write the theory down. More
precisely, write down a program for the state evolution together with the initial
conditions, and define the complexity of the theory as the size in bits of the file that
contains the program. This quantification is known as algorithmic information or
Kolmogorov complexity [LV08] and is consistent with our intuition, since an elegant
theory will have a shorter program than an inelegant one, and extra parameters
need extra space to code, resulting in longer programs [Wal05, Gru¨07]. From now
on I identify theories with programs and write Length(q) for the length=complexity
of program=theory q.
Standard model versus string theory. To keep the discussion simple, let us
pretend that standard model (SM) + gravity (G) and string theory (S) both qualify
as ToEs. SM+Gravity is a mixture of a few relatively elegant theories, but contains
about 20 parameters that need to be specified. String theory is truly elegant, but
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ensuring that it reduces to the standard model needs sophisticated extra assumptions
(e.g. the right compactification).
SM+G can be written down in one line, plus we have to give 20+ constants, so
lets say one page. The meaning (the axioms) of all symbols and operators require
another page. Then we need the basics, natural, real, complex numbers, sets (ZFC),
etc., which is another page. That makes 3 pages for a complete description in
first-order logic. There are a lot of subtleties though: (a) The axioms are likely
mathematically inconsistent, (b) it’s not immediately clear how the axioms lead to
a program simulating our universe, (c) the theory does not predict the outcome of
random events, and (d) some other problems. So to transform the description into
a C program simulating our universe, needs a couple of pages more, but I would
estimate around 10 pages overall suffices, which is about 20’000 symbols=bytes. Of
course this program will be (i) a very inefficient simulation and (ii) a very naive
coding of SM+G. I conjecture that the shortest program for SM+G on a universal
Turing machine is much shorter, maybe even only one tenth of this. The numbers are
only a quick rule-of-thumb guess. If we start from string theory (S), we need about
the same length. S ismuchmore elegant, but we need to code the compactification to
describe our universe, which effectively amounts to the same. Note that everything
else in the world (all other physics, chemistry, etc,) is emergent.
It would require a major effort to quantify which theory is the simpler one in the
sense defined above, but I think it would be worth the effort. It is a quantitative
objective way to decide between theories that are (so far) predictively indistinguish-
able.
CToE selection principle. It is trivial to write down a program for an All-a-Carte
multiverse (A). It is also not too hard to write a program for the universal multiverse
(U), see Section 6. Lengthwise (A) easily wins over (U), and (U) easily wins over
(P) and (S), but as discussed (A) and (U) have serious defects. On the other hand,
these theories can only be used for predictions after extra specifications: Roughly,
for (A) this amounts to tabling the whole universe, (U) requires defining a ToE in
the conventional sense, (P) needs 20 or so parameters and (S) a compactification
scheme. Hence localization-wise (P) and (S) easily win over (U), and (U) easily wins
over (A). Given this trade-off, it now nearly suggests itself that we should include
the description length of the observer location in our ToE evaluation measure. That
is,
among two CToEs, select the one that has shorter overall length
Length(i) + Length(e) + Length(l) (1)
For an All-a-Carte multiverse, the last term contains the gargantuan string u, cata-
pulting it from the shortest ToE to the longest CToE, hence (A) will not minimize
(1).
ToE versus UToE. Consider any (C)ToE and its program q, e.g. (P) or (S). Since
(U) runs all programs including q, specifying q means localizing (C)ToE q in (U).
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So (U)+q is a CToE whose length is just some constant bits (the simulation part
of (U)) more than that of (C)ToE q. So whatever (C)ToE physicists come up with,
(U) is nearly as good as this theory. This essentially clarifies the paradoxical status
of (U). Naked, (U) is a theory of nothing, but in combination with another ToE it
excels to a good CToE, albeit slightly longer=worse than the latter.
Localization within our universe. So far we have only localized our universe
in the multiverse, but not ourselves in the universe. To localize our Sun, we could
e.g. sort (and index) stars by their creation date, which the model (i)+(e) provides.
Most stars last for 1-10 billion years (say an average of 5 billion years). The universe
is 14 billion years old, so most stars may be 3rd generation (Sun definitely is), so
the total number of stars that have ever existed should very roughly be 3 times
the current number of stars of about 1011×1011. Probably “3” is very crude, but
this doesn’t really matter for sake of the argument. In order to localize our Sun
we only need its index, which can be coded in about log2(3×1011×1011) .=75 bits.
Similarly we can sort and index planets and observers. To localize earth among
the 8 planets needs 3 bits. To localize yourself among 7 billion humans needs 33
bits. Alternatively one could simply specify the (x,y,z,t) coordinate of the observer,
which requires more but still only very few bits. These localization penalties are
tiny compared to the difference in predictive power (to be quantified later) of the
various theories (ego/geo/helio/cosmo). This explains and justifies theories of large
universes in which we occupy a random location.
5 Complete ToE - Formalization
This section formalizes the CToE selection principle and what accounts for a CToE.
Universal Turing machines are used to formalize the notion of programs as models
for generating our universe and our observations. I also introduce more realistic
observers with limited perception ability.
Objective ToE. Since we essentially identify a ToE with a program generating a
universe, we need to fix some general purpose programming language on a general
purpose computer. In theoretical computer science, the standard model is a so-
called Universal Turing Machine (UTM) [LV08]. It takes a program coded as a
finite binary string q ∈ {0,1}∗, executes it and outputs a finite or infinite binary
string u∈{0,1}∗∪{0,1}∞. The details do not matter to us, since drawn conclusions
are typically independent of them. In this section we only consider q with infinite
output
UTM(q) = uq1u
q
2u
q
3 ... =: u
q
1:∞
In our case, uq1:∞ will be the space-time universe (or multiverse) generated by ToE
candidate q. So q incorporates items (i) and (e) of Section 4. Surely our universe
doesn’t look like a bit string, but can be coded as one as explained in Sections 2
and 7. We have some simple coding in mind, e.g. uq1:N being the (fictitious) binary
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data file of a high-resolution 3D movie of the whole universe from big bang to big
crunch, augmented by uqN+1:∞≡0 if the universe is finite. Again, the details do not
matter.
Observational process and subjective complete ToE. As we have demon-
strated it is also important to localize the observer. In order to avoid potential
qualms with modeling human observers, consider as a surrogate a (conventional not
extra cosmic) video camera filming=observing parts of the world. The camera may
be fixed on Earth or installed on an autonomous robot. It records part of the uni-
verse u denoted by o=o1:∞. (If the lifetime of the observer is finite, we append zeros
to the finite observation o1:N).
I only consider direct observations like with a camera. Electrons or atomic decays
or quasars are not directly observed, but with some (classical) instrument. It is the
indicator or camera image of the instrument that is observed (which physicists then
usually interpret). This setup avoids having to deal with any form of informal
correspondence between theory and real world, or with subtleties of the quantum-
mechanical measurement process. The only philosophical presupposition I make is
that it is possible to determine uncontroversially whether two finite binary strings
(on paper or file) are the same or differ in some bits.
In a computable universe, the observational process within it, is obviously also
computable, i.e. there exists a program s∈{0,1}∗ that extracts observations o from
universe u. Formally
UTM(s, uq1:∞) = o
sq
1:∞ (2)
where we have extended the definition of UTM to allow access to an extra infinite
input stream uq1:∞. So o
sq
1:∞ is the sequence observed by subject s in universe u
q
1:∞
generated by q. Program s contains all information about the location and orienta-
tion and perception abilities of the observer/camera, hence specifies not only item
(l) but also item (o) of Section 4.
A Complete ToE (CToE) consists of a specification of a (ToE,subject) pair (q,s).
Since it includes s it is a Subjective ToE.
CToE selection principle. So far, s and q were fictitious subjects and universe
programs. Let otrue1:t be the past observations of some concrete observer in our uni-
verse, e.g. your own personal experience of the world from birth till today. The future
observations otruet+1:∞ are of course unknown. By definition, o1:t contains all available
experience of the observer, including e.g. outcomes of scientific experiments, school
education, read books, etc.
The observation sequence osq1:∞ generated by a correct CToE must be consistent
with the true observations otrue1:t . If o
sq
1:t would differ from o
true
1:t (in a single bit) the
subject would have ‘experimental’ evidence that (q,s) is not a perfect CToE. We can
now formalize the CToE selection principle as follows
Among a given set of perfect (osq1:t = o
true
1:t ) CToEs {(q, s)}
select the one of smallest length Length(q) + Length(s) (3)
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Minimizing length is motivated by Ockham’s razor. Inclusion of s is necessary to
avoid degenerate ToEs like (U) and (A). The selected CToE (q∗,s∗) can and should
then be used for forecasting future observations via ...oforecastt+1:∞ =UTM(s
∗,uq
∗
1:∞).
6 Universal ToE - Formalization
The Universal ToE is a sanity critical point in the development of ToEs, and will
formally be defined and investigated in this section.
Definition of Universal ToE. The Universal ToE generates all computable uni-
verses. The generated multiverse can be depicted as an infinite matrix in which each
row corresponds to one universe.
q UTM(q)
ǫ uǫ1 u
ǫ
2 u
ǫ
3 u
ǫ
4 u
ǫ
5 · · ·
0 u01 u
0
2 u
0
3 u
0
4 · · ·· · ·
1 u11 u
1
2 u
1
3 · · ·· · ·
00 u001 u
00
2 · · ·· · ·
...
...
...
...
To fit this into our framework we need to define a single program q˘ that generates a
single string corresponding to this matrix. The standard way to linearize an infinite
matrix is to dovetail in diagonal serpentines though the matrix:
u˘1:∞ := u
ǫ
1u
0
1u
ǫ
2u
ǫ
3u
0
2u
1
1u
00
1 u
1
2u
0
3u
ǫ
4u
ǫ
5u
0
4u
1
3u
00
2 ...
Formally, define a bijection i= 〈q,k〉 between a (program, location) pair (q,k) and
the natural numbers IN∋i, and define u˘i :=uqk. It is not hard to construct an explicit
program q˘ for UTM that computes u˘1:∞=u
q˘
1:∞=UTM(q˘).
One might think that it would have been simpler or more natural to generalize
Turing machines to have matrix “tapes”. But this is deceiving. If we allow for
Turing machines with matrix output, we also should allow for and enumerate all
programs q that have a matrix output. This leads to a 3d tensor that needs to be
converted to a 2d matrix, which is no simpler than the linearization above.
Partial ToEs. Cutting the universes into bits and interweaving them into one string
might appear messy, but is unproblematic for two reasons: First, the bijection i=
〈q,k〉 is very simple, so any particular universe string uq can easily be recovered from
u˘. Second, such an extraction will be included in the localization / observational
process s, i.e. s will contain a specification of the relevant universe q and which bits
k are to be observed.
More problematic is that many q will not produce an infinite universe. This
can be fixed as follows: First, we need to be more precise about what it means for
UTM(q) to write uq. We introduce an extra symbol ‘#’ for ‘undefined’ and set each
bit uqi initially to ‘#’. The UTM running q can output bits in any order but can
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overwrite each location # only once, either with a 0 or with a 1. We implicitly
assumed this model above, and similarly for s. Now we (have to) also allow for q
that leave some or all bits unspecified.
The interleaving computation UTM(s,UTM(q))=o of s and q works as follows:
Whenever s wants to read a bit from uq1:∞ that q has not (yet) written, control is
transferred to q until this bit is written. If it is never written, then o will be only
partially defined, but such s are usually not considered. (If the undefined location
is before t, CToE (q,s) is not perfect, since otrue1:t is completely defined.)
Alternatively one may define a more complex dynamic bijection 〈·,·〉 that orders
the bits in the order they are created, or one resorts to generalized Turing machines
[Sch00, Sch02] which can overwrite locations and also greatly increase the set of
describable universes. These variants (allow to) make u˘ and all uq complete (no ‘#’
symbol, tape∈{0,1}∞).
ToE versus UToE.We can formalize the argument in the last section of simulating
a ToE by UToE as follows: If (q,s) is a CToE, then (q˘,s˜) based on UToE q˘ and
observer s˜ := rqs, where program r extracts uq from u˘ and then osq from uq, is an
equivalent but slightly larger CToE, since UTM(s˜,u˘)=oqs=UTM(s,uq) by definition
of s˜ and Length(q˘)+Length(s˜)=Length(q)+Length(s)+O(1).
The best CToE. Finally, one may define the best CToE (of an observer with
experience otrue1:t ) as
UCToE := argmin
q,s
{Length(q) + Length(s) : osq1:t = otrue1:t }
where osq1:∞=UTM(s,UTM(q)). This may be regarded as a formalization of the holy
grail in physics; of finding such a TOE.
7 Extensions
Our CToE selection principle is applicable to perfect, deterministic, discrete, and
complete models q of our universe. None of the existing sane world models is of this
kind. In this section I extend the CToE selection principle to more realistic, partial,
approximate, probabilistic, and/or parametric models for finite, infinite and even
continuous universes.
Partial theories. Not all interesting theories are ToEs. Indeed, most theories are
only partial models of aspects of our world.
We can reduce the problem of selecting good partial theories to CToE selection
as follows: Let otrue1:t be the complete observation, and (q,s) be some theory explain-
ing only some observations but not all. For instance, q might be the heliocentric
model and s be such that all bits in otrue1:t that correspond to planetary positions are
predicted correctly. The other bits in oqs1:t are undefined, e.g. the position of cars.
We can augment q with a (huge) table b of all bits for which oqsi 6= otruei . Together,
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(q,b,s) allows to reconstruct otrue1:t exactly. Hence for two different theories, the one
with smaller length
Length(q) + Length(b) + Length(s) (4)
should be selected. We can actually spare ourselves from tabling all those bits that
are unpredicted by all q under consideration, since they contribute the same overall
constant. So when comparing two theories it is sufficient to consider only those
observations that are correctly predicted by one (or both) theories.
If two partial theories (q,s) and (q′,s′) predict the same phenomena equally well
(i.e. oqs1:t=o
q′s′
1:t 6=otrue1:t ), then b=b′ and minimizing (4) reduces to minimizing (3).
Approximate theories. Most theories are not perfect but only approximate re-
ality, even in their limited domain. The geocentric model is less accurate than the
heliocentric model, Newton’s mechanics approximates general relativity, etc. Ap-
proximate theories can be viewed as a version of partial theories. For example,
consider predicting locations of planets with locations being coded by (truncated)
real numbers in binary representation, then Einstein gets more bits right than New-
ton. The remaining erroneous bits could be tabled as above. Errors are often more
subtle than simple bit errors, in which case correction programs rather than just
tables are needed.
Celestial example. The ancient celestial models just capture the movement of
some celestial bodies, and even those only imperfectly. Nevertheless it is interesting
to compare them. Let us take as our corpus of observations otrue1:t , say, all astronom-
ical tables available in the year 1600, and ignore all other experience.
The geocentric model qG more or less directly describes the observations, hence
sG is relatively simple. In the heliocentric model qH it is necessary to include in
sH a non-trivial coordinate transformation to explain the geocentric astronomical
data. Assuming both models were perfect, then, if and only if qH is simpler than
qG by a margin that is larger than the extra complications due to the coordinate
transformation (Length(qG)−Length(qH) > Length(sH)−Length(sG)), we should
regard the heliocentric model as better.
If/since the heliocentric model is more accurate, we have to additionally penalize
the geocentric model by the number of bits it doesn’t predict correctly. This clearly
makes the heliocentric model superior.
Probabilistic theories. Contrary to a deterministic theory that predicts the future
from the past for sure, a probabilistic theory assigns to each future a certain chance
that it will occur. Equivalently, a deterministic universe is described by some string
u, while a probabilistic universe is described by some probability distribution Q(u),
the a priori probability of u. (In the special case of Q(u′) = 1 for u′ = u and 0
else, Q describes the deterministic universe u.) Similarly, the observational process
may be probabilistic. Let S(o|u) be the probability of observing o in universe u.
Together, (Q,S) is a probabilistic CToE that predicts observation o with probability
P (o)=
∑
uS(o|u)Q(u). A computable probabilistic CToE is one for which there exist
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programs (of lengths Length(Q) and Length(S)) that compute the functions Q(·)
and S(·|·).
Consider now the true observation otrue1:t . The larger P (o
true
1:t ) the “better” is
(Q,S). In the degenerate deterministic case, P (otrue1:t ) = 1 is maximal for a correct
CToE, and 0 for a wrong one. In every other case, (Q,S) is only a partial theory
that needs completion, since it does not compute otrue1:t . Given P , it is possible to
code otrue1:t in |log2P (otrue1:t )| bits (arithmetic or Shannon-Fano code). Assuming that
otrue1:t is indeed sampled from P , one can show that with high probability this is the
shortest possible code. So there exists an effective description of otrue1:t of length
Length(Q) + Length(S) + |log2P (otrue1:t )| (5)
This expression should be used (minimized) when comparing probabilistic CToEs.
The principle is reminiscent of classical two-part Minimum Encoding Length prin-
ciples like MML and MDL [Wal05, Gru¨07]. Note that the noise corresponds to the
errors and the log term to the error table of the previous paragraphs.
Probabilistic examples. Assume S(o|o) = 1 ∀o and consider the observation se-
quence otrue1:t = u
true
1:t = 11001001000011111101101010100. If we assume this is a
sequence of fair coin flips, then Q(o1:t) = P (o1:t) = 2
−t are very simple functions,
but |log2P (o1:t)|= t is large. If we assume that otrue1:t is the binary expansion of π
(which it is), then the corresponding deterministic Q is somewhat more complex,
but |log2P (otrue1:t )|= 0. So for sufficiently large t, the deterministic model of π is
selected, since it leads to a shorter code (5) than the fair-coin-flip model.
Quantum theory is (argued by physicists to be) truly random. Hence all mod-
ern ToE candidates (P+G, S, C, M) are probabilistic. This yields huge additive
constants |log2P (otrue1:t )| to the otherwise quite elegant theories Q. Schmidhuber
[Sch97, Sch00] argues that all apparent physical randomness is actually only pseudo
random, i.e. generated by a small program. If this is true and we could find the ran-
dom number generator, we could instantly predict all apparent quantum-mechanical
random events. This would be a true improvement of existing theories, and indeed
the corresponding CToE would be significantly shorter. In [Hut05, Sec.8.6.2] I give
an argument why believing in true random noise may be an unscientific position.
Theories with parameters. Many theories in physics depend on real-valued pa-
rameters. Since observations have finite accuracy, it is sufficient to specify these pa-
rameters to some finite accuracy. Hence the theories including their finite-precision
parameters can be coded in finite length. There are general results and techniques
[Wal05, Gru¨07] that allow a comfortable handling of all this. For instance, for
smooth parametric models, a parameter accuracy of O(1/
√
n) is needed, which re-
quires 1
2
log2n+O(1) bits per parameter. The explicable O(1) term depends on the
smoothness of the model and prevents ‘cheating’ (e.g. zipping two parameters into
one).
Infinite and continuous universes. So far we have assumed that each time-slice
through our universe can be described in finitely many bits and time is discrete.
17
Assume our universe were the infinite continuous 3+1 dimensional Minkowski space
IR4 occupied by (tiny) balls (“particles”). Consider all points (x,y,z,t)∈ IR4 with
rational coordinates, and let i = 〈x,y,z,t〉 be a bijection to the natural numbers
similarly to the dovetailing in Section 6. Let ui=1 if (x,y,z,t) is occupied by a particle
and 0 otherwise. String u1:∞ is an exact description of this universe. The above idea
generalizes to any so-called separable mathematical space. Since all spaces occurring
in established physical theories are separable, there is currently no ToE candidate
that requires uncountable universes. Maybe continuous theories are just convenient
approximations of deeper discrete theories. An even more fundamental argument
put forward in this context by [Sch00] is that the Loewenheim-Skolem theorem (an
apparent paradox) implies that Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory (ZFC) has a countably
infinite model. Since all physical theories so far are formalizable in ZFC, it follows
they all have a countable model. For some strange reason (possibly an historical
artifact), the adopted uncountable interpretation seems just more convenient.
Multiple theories. Some proponents of pluralism and some opponents of reduc-
tionism argue that we need multiple theories on multiple scales for different (over-
lapping) application domains. They argue that a ToE is not desirable and/or not
possible. Here I give a reason why we need one single fundamental theory (with
all other theories having to be regarded as approximations): Consider two Theories
(T1 and T2) with (proclaimed) application domains A1 and A2, respectively.
If predictions of T1 and T2 coincide on their intersection A1∩A2 (or if A1 and
A2 are disjoint), we can trivially “unify” T1 and T2 to one theory T by taking their
union. Of course, if this does not result in any simplification, i.e. if Length(T ) =
Length(T1)+Length(T2), we gain nothing. But since nearly all modern theories
have some common basis, e.g. use natural or real numbers, a formal unification of
the generating programs nearly always leads to Length(q)<Length(q1)+Length(q2).
The interesting case is when T1 and T2 lead to different forecasts on A1∩A2.
For instance, particle versus wave theory with the atomic world at their intersection,
unified by quantum theory. Then we need a reconciliation of T1 and T2, that is,
a single theory T for A1∪A2. Ockham’s razor tells us to choose a simple (elegant)
unification. This rules out naive/ugly/complex solutions like developing a third
theory for A1∩A2 or attributing parts of A1∩A2 to T1 or T2 as one sees fit, or
averaging the predictions of T1 and T2. Of course T must be consistent with the
observations.
Pluralism on a meta level, i.e. allowing besides Ockham’s razor other principles
for selecting theories, has the same problem on a meta-level: which principle should
one use in a concrete situation? To argue that this (or any other) problem cannot
be formalized/quantized/mechanized would be (close to) an anti-scientific attitude.
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8 Justification of Ockham’s Razor
We now prove Ockham’s razor under the assumptions stated below and compare it
to the No Free Lunch myth. The result itself is not novel [Sch00]. The intention
and contribution is to provide an elementary but still sufficiently formal argument,
which in particular is free of more sophisticated concepts like Solomonoff’s a-priori
distribution.
Ockham’s razor principle demands to “take the simplest theory consistent with
the observations”.
Ockham’s razor could be regarded as correct if among all considered theo-
ries, the one selected by Ockham’s razor is the one that most likely leads
to correct predictions.
Assumptions. Assume we live in the universal multiverse u˘ that consists of all com-
putable universes, i.e. UToE is a correct/true/perfect ToE. Since every computable
universe is contained in UToE, it is at least under the computability assumption im-
possible to disprove this assumptions. The second assumption we make is that our
location in the multiverse is random. We can divide this into two steps: First, the
universe uq in which we happen to be is chosen randomly. Second, our “location” s
within uq is chosen at random. We call these the universal self-sampling assumption.
The crucial difference to the informal anthropic self-sampling assumption used in
doomsday arguments is discussed below.
Recall the observer program s˜ :=rqs introduced in Section 5. We will make the
simplifying assumption that s is the identity, i.e. restrict ourselves to “objective”
observers that observe their universe completely: UTM(s˜,u˘) = oqs =UTM(s,uq) =
uq =UTM(q). Formally, the universal self-sampling assumption can be stated as
follows:
A priori it is equally likely to be in any of the universes uq generated by
some program q∈{0,1}∗.
To be precise, we consider all programs with length bounded by some constant L,
and take the limit L→∞.
Counting consistent universes. Let otrue1:t =u
true
1:t be the universe observed so far
and
QL := {q : Length(q) ≤ L and UTM(q) = utrue1:t ∗}
be the set of all consistent universes (which is non-empty for large L), where * is
any continuation of utrue1:t . Given u
true
1:t , we know we are in one of the universes in
QL, which implies by the universal self-sampling assumption a uniform sampling in
QL. Let
qmin := argmin
q
{Length(q) : q ∈ QL} and l := Length(qmin)
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be the shortest consistent q and its length, respectively. Adding (unread) “garbage”
g after the end of a program q does not change its behavior, i.e. if q∈QL, then also
qg ∈QL provided that Length(qg)≤L. Hence for every g with Length(g)≤L−l,
we have qming ∈QL. Since there are about 2L−l such g, we have |QL|>∼ 2L−l. It
is a deep theorem in algorithmic information theory [LV08] that there are also not
significantly more than 2L−l programs q equivalent to qmin. The proof idea is as
follows: One can show that if there are many long equivalent programs, then there
must also be a short one. In our case the shortest one is qmin, which upper bounds
the number of long programs. Together this shows that
|QL| ≈ 2L−l
Probabilistic prediction. Given observations utrue1:t we now determine the proba-
bility of being in a universe that continues with ut+1:n, where n>t. Similarly to the
previous paragraph we can approximately count the number of such universes:
QnL := {q : Length(q) ≤ L and UTM(q) = utrue1:t ut+1:n∗} ⊂ QL
qnmin := argminq
{Length(q) : q ∈ QnL} and ln := Length(qnmin)
|QnL| ≈ 2L−ln
The probability of being in a universe with future ut+1:n given u
true
1:t is determined
by their relative number
P (ut+1:n|utrue1:t ) =
|QnL|
|QL| ≈ 2
−(ln−l) (6)
which is (asymptotically) independent of L.
Ockham’s razor. Relation (6) implies that the most likely continuation uˆt+1:n :=
argmaxut+1:nP (ut+1:n|utrue1:t ) is (approximately) the one that minimizes ln. By defini-
tion, qmin is the shortest program in QL=
⋃
ut+1:nQ
n
L. Therefore
P (uˆt+1:n|utrue1:t ) ≈ P (uqmint+1:n|utrue1:t )
The accuracy of ≈ is clarified later. In words
We are most likely in a universe that is (equivalent to) the simplest
universe consistent with our past observations.
This shows that Ockham’s razor selects the theory that most likely leads to correct
predictions, and hence proves (under the stated assumptions) that Ockham’s razor
is correct.
Ockham’s razor is correct under the universal self-sampling assumption.
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Discussion. It is important to note that the universal self-sampling assumption has
not by itself any bias towards simple models q. Indeed, most q in QL have length
close to L, and since we sample uniformly from QL this actually represents a huge
bias towards large models for L→∞.
The result is also largely independent of the uniform sampling assumption. For
instance, sampling a length l∈ IN w.r.t. any reasonable (i.e. slower than exponen-
tially decreasing) distribution and then q of length l uniformly leads to the same
conclusion.
How reasonable is the UToE? We have already discussed that it is nearly but
not quite as good as any other correct ToE. The philosophical, albeit not practical
advantage of UToE is that it is a safer bet, since we can never be sure about the
future correctness of a more specific ToE. An a priori argument in favor of UToE
is as follows: What is the best candidate for a ToE before i.e. in absence of any
observations? If somebody (but how and who?) would tell us that the universe is
computable but nothing else, universal self-sampling seems like a reasonable a priori
UToE.
Comparison to anthropic self-sampling. Our universal self-sampling assump-
tion is related to anthropic self-sampling [Bos02] but crucially different. The an-
thropic self-sampling assumption states that a priori you are equally likely any of
the (human) observers in our universe. First, we sample from any universe and any
location (living or dead) in the multiverse and not only among human (or reasonably
intelligent) observers. Second, we have no problem of what counts as a reasonable
(human) observer. Third, our principle is completely formal.
Nevertheless the principles are related since (see inclusion of s) given otrue1:t we
also sample from the set of reasonable observers, since otrue1:t includes snapshots of
other (human) observers.
No Free Lunch (NFL) myth. Wolpert [WM97] considers algorithms for finding
the minimum of a function, and compares their average performance. The sim-
plest performance measure is the number of function evaluations needed to find the
global minimum. The average is taken uniformly over the set of all functions from
and to some fixed finite domain. Since sampling uniformly leads with (very) high
probability to a totally random function (white noise), it is clear that on average
no optimization algorithm can perform better than exhaustive search, and no rea-
sonable algorithm (that is one that probes every function argument at most once)
performs worse. That is, all reasonable optimization algorithms are equally bad on
average. This is the essence of Wolpert’s NFL theorem and all variations thereof I
am aware of, including the ones for less uniform distributions.
While NFL theorems are cute observations, they are obviously irrelevant, since
nobody cares about the maximum of white noise functions. Despite NFL being the
holy grail in some research communities, the NFL myth has little to no practical
implication [Sto01].
An analogue of NFL for prediction would be as follows: Let u1:n ∈ {0,1}n be
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uniformly sampled, i.e. the probability of u1:n is λ(u1:n)=2
−n. Given utrue1:t we want
to predict ut+1:n. Let u
p
t+1:n be any deterministic prediction. It is clear that all
deterministic predictors p are on average equally bad (w.r.t. symmetric performance
measures) in predicting uniform noise (λ(upt+1:n|utrue1:t )=2−(n−t)) .
How does this compare to the positive result under universal self-
sampling? There we also used a uniform distribution, but over effective mod-
els=theories=programs. A priori we assumed all programs to be equally likely,
but the resulting universe distribution is far from uniform. Phrased differently, we
piped uniform noise (via M , see below) through a universal Turing machine. We
assume a universal distribution M , rather than a uniform distribution λ.
Just assuming that the world has any effective structure breaks NFL down,
and makes Ockham’s razor work [SH02]. The assumption that the world has some
structure is as safe as (or I think even weaker than) the assumption that e.g. classical
logic is good for reasoning about the world (and the latter one has to assume to make
science meaningful).
Some technical details∗. Readers not familiar with Algorithmic Information The-
ory might want to skip this paragraph. P (u) in (6) tends for L→∞ to Solomonoff’s
a priori distribution M(u). In the definition of M [Sol64] only programs of length
=L, rather than ≤L are considered, but since limL→∞ 1L
∑L
l=1al= limL→∞aL if the
latter exists, they are equivalent. Modern definitions involve a 2−l(q)-weighted sum
of prefix programs, which is also equivalent [LV08]. Finally, M(u) is also equal
to the probability that a universal monotone Turing machine with uniform ran-
dom noise on the input tape outputs a string starting with u [Hut05]. Further,
l ≡ Length(qmin) =Km(u) is the monotone complexity of u := utrue1:t . It is a deep
result in Algorithmic Information Theory that Km(u)≈−log2M(u). For most u
equality holds within an additive constant, but for some u only within logarithmic
accuracy [LV08]. Taking the ratio of M(u)≈2−Km(u) for u=utrue1:t ut+1:n and u=utrue1:t
yields (6).
The argument/result is not only technical but also subtle: Not only are there 2L−l
programs equivalent to qmin but there are also “nearly” 2
L−l programs that lead to
totally different predictions. Luckily they don’t harm probabilistic predictions based
on P , and seldomly affect deterministic predictions based on qmin in practice but
can do so in theory [Hut06b]. One can avoid this problem by augmenting Ockham’s
razor with Epicurus principle of multiple explanations, taking all theories consistent
with the observations but weigh them according to their length. See [LV08, Hut05]
for details.
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9 Discussion
Summary. I have demonstrated that a theory that perfectly describes our universe
or multiverse, rather than being a Theory of Everything (ToE), might also be a
theory of nothing. I have shown that a predictively meaningful theory can be ob-
tained if the theory is augmented by the localization of the observer. This resulted
in a truly Complete Theory of Everything (CToE), which consists of a conventional
(objective) ToE plus a (subjective) observer process. Ockham’s razor quantified
in terms of code-length minimization has been invoked to select the “best” theory
(UCToE).
Assumptions. The construction of the subjective complete theory of everything
rested on the following assumptions: (i) The observers’ experience of the world
consists of a single temporal binary sequence otrue1:t . All other physical and episte-
mological concepts are derived. (ii) There exists an objective world independent
of any particular observer in it. (iii) The world is computable, i.e. there exists an
algorithm (a finite binary string) which when executed outputs the whole space-time
universe. This assumption implicitly assumes (i.e. implies) that temporally stable
binary strings exist. (iv) The observer is a computable process within the objective
world. (v) The algorithms for universe and observer are chosen at random, which I
called universal self-sampling assumption.
Implications. As demonstrated, under these assumptions, the scientific quest for
a theory of everything can be formalized. As a side result, this allows to separate
objective knowledge q from subjective knowledge s. One might even try to argue
that if q for the best (q,s) pair is non-trivial, this is evidence for the existence of an
objective reality. Another side result is that there is no hard distinction between a
universe and a multiverse; the difference is qualitative and semantic. Last but not
least, another implication is the validity of Ockham’s razor.
Conclusion. Respectable researchers, including Nobel Laureates, have dismissed
and embraced each single model of the world mentioned in Section 2, at different
times in history and concurrently. (Excluding All-a-Carte ToEs which I haven’t seen
discussed before.) As I have shown, Universal ToE is the sanity critical point.
The most popular (pseudo) justifications of which theories are (in)sane have been
references to the dogmatic Bible, Popper’s limited falsifiability principle, and wrong
applications of Ockham’s razor. This paper contained a more serious treatment of
world model selection. I introduced and discussed the usefulness of a theory in terms
of predictive power based on model and observer localization complexity.
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A List of Notation
G,H,E,P,S,C,M,U,R,A,... specific models/theories defined in Section 2
T ∈{G,H,E,P,S,C,M,U,R,A,...} theory/model
ToE Theoy of Everything (in any sense)
ToE candidate a theory that might be a partial or perfect or wrong ToE
UToE Universal ToE
CToE Complete ToE (i+e+l+n+o)
UCToE Universal Complete ToE
theory model which can explain≈describe≈predict≈compress observations
universe typically refers to visible/observed universe
multiverse un- or only weakly connected collection of universes
predictive power precision and coverage
precision the accuracy of a theory
coverage how many phenomena a theory can explain/predict
prediction refers to unseen, usually future observations
computability assumption: that our universe is computable
qT ∈{0,1}∗ the program that generates the universe modeled by theory T
uq∈{0,1}∞ the universe generated by program q: uq=UTM(q)
UTM Universal Turing Machine
s∈{0,1}∗ observation model/program. Extracts o from u.
oqs∈{0,1}∞ Subject’s s observations in universe uq: oqs=UTM(s,uq)
otrue1:t True past observations
q˘,u˘ Program and universe of UToE
S(o|u) Probability of observing o in universe u
Q(u) Probability of universe u (according to some prob. theory T )
P (o) Probability of observing o
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